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Note
Standing Up to Bad Patents: Allowing Non-Infringing
Direct Competitors to Satisfy the Article III Standing
Requirements Appealing an Adverse Inter Partes
Review Decision to the Federal Circuit
Ryan Fitzgerald*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, Congress has come to recognize the threat
invalid patents1 pose to innovation.2 These invalid patents, issued by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or “Patent Office”), can stifle innovation by precluding competitors from utilizing
the patented technology3 or by subjecting competitors to a looming

* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. Mechanical Engineering 2016, University of Notre Dame. I would like to most importantly thank Professor Jill Hasday for her tremendous guidance throughout the Note-writing process
and for providing valuable feedback on my many drafts. I would also like to thank Professor Tom Cotter for being a great instructor and teaching me almost everything I
know about patents. Copyright © 2020 by Ryan Fitzgerald.
1. An invalid patent is a patent that fails to meet one or more of the statutory
patentability requirements. To meet the patentability requirements, the patented invention must be: (1) patentable subject matter; (2) novel; (3) nonobvious; and (4) the
patent must adequately describe the invention so that others may practice it. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112; Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)Valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271,
278–79 (2016). For a discussion of what is required to meet each of these requirements, see generally infra note 8. While every patent application is examined by the
U.S. Patent Office to determine whether it meets these patentability requirements,
some patents may still be issued without meeting them. This may be because the burden is on the Patent Office to prove that an application fails to meet one of these requirements, or, because of constrained resources, the Patent Office is incentivized to
issue patents without performing a sufficient review. See infra Part I.A.
2. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39 (2011) (“[Q]uestionable patents are too easily
obtained and are too difficult to challenge.”); see also S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 19 (2008)
(“Despite Congress’s attempts to improve the reexamination system, it remains troublesomely inefficient and ineffective as a truly viable alternative for resolving questions of patent validity.”).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 154; infra Part I.B.
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threat of significant infringement damages.4 When the Patent Office
improperly issues these invalid patents, patent owners are able to monopolize technology that should otherwise remain in the public domain. Recognizing the threat that invalid patents pose, Congress established several post-issuance proceedings, including inter partes
review (IPR), to “provid[e] a more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have issued”5 to encourage direct competitors
and other third parties to file and obtain invalidity rulings on these
patents.6 By obtaining an invalidity ruling on these patents, competitors can open the technology to public use, helping drive innovation.
Established in 2012, inter partes review is a trial proceeding conducted before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)7 to assess
whether the claims of a previously granted patent fail to meet the novelty and nonobviousness statutory requirements of patentability.8 If
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 271. Infringement occurs when a third party utilizes the patented technology without the patent owner’s permission. It is a strict liability offense
and therefore does not require knowledge of the patent nor knowledge of use of the
patent owner’s technology to be held liable.
5. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39 (2011).
6. The various post-issuance proceedings seek to increase third-party participation in the policing of patent rights by allowing third parties to come forward with arguments that the granted patent is invalid for already being in the public domain or is
otherwise unpatentable. See AIA Trial Types, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www
.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/aia
-trial-types [https://perma.cc/X7TG-8NPV].
7. The PTAB is an adjudicative body within the PTO, established through the
America Invents Act (AIA) to conduct trials for the various post-grant proceedings to
decide issues of patentability, including for IPRs, among other duties. See generally Janet Gongola, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board: Who Are They and What Do They Do?,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/
newsletter/inventors-eye/patent-trial-and-appeal-board-who-are-they-and-what
[https://perma.cc/3TAS-GU8K] (July 8, 2019).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 311. To obtain a patent, an applicant must invent something
new, useful, and nonobvious. The main statutory requirements include: § 101 patentable subject matter; § 102 novelty; § 103 nonobviousness; and § 112 best mode, enablement, written description. Novelty assesses whether every element of the claimed
invention is present in a single reference, disclosed to the public, prior to the inventor’s
application. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2131 (9th ed. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]. Nonobviousness assesses whether the
claimed invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art,
based on what has been disclosed to the public, such that the applicant is not deserving
of a patent. See id. § 2141. An invention is considered enabled if the invention is described in such terms that one of skill in the art can make and use the claimed invention. See id. § 2164.01. The written description requirement requires the applicant adequately describe the invention in sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the
art can recognize that the inventor has the knowledge, or possession, of the claimed
invention. See id. § 2163.
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the PTAB concludes that the patent is invalid, then the patent is no
longer enforceable, opening up the technology for use by others without the risk of infringement.
If the patent challenger is unable to establish that the patent is
invalid,9 then it may appeal the PTAB decision to the Federal Circuit.10
However, because the PTAB is part of an administrative agency, when
appealing to the federal courts the patent challenger must meet the
Article III standing requirements—suffering an injury in fact. Mere
participation in the agency proceeding is not enough.11 In the majority
of IPR appeals, this is not an issue because the patent challenger is
subject to a district court infringement action.12 But in the approximately twenty percent of cases when the patent challenger is not allegedly infringing the challenged patent,13 establishing an injury sufficient to confer Article III is more difficult. Through its recent decisions,
the Federal Circuit has severely heightened what a direct competitor
must show to establish an injury sufficient to confer Article III standing.14 Regardless of how similar the patent challenger’s technology is
to the challenged patent, the Federal Circuit essentially requires the
patent challenger to infringe the patent and risk treble damages
and/or an injunction to satisfy the injury in fact requirements.15
This Note argues that, to better align with Congress’s intent and
Supreme Court precedent on the constitutional requirements of
standing, the Federal Circuit should expand its interpretation of what
constitutes an injury in fact for non-infringing direct competitors appealing an IPR decision. The proposed solution, the Direct Competitor
Standing Test (DCS Test), better recognizes the unique injuries and
interests at stake in patent cases. In the first step of the DCS Test, the
patent challenger must show that it has either an existing patent portfolio16 or existing design portfolio in a similar technology area as the
9. The patent challenger must establish the patent is invalid by a preponderance
of the evidence during an IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). In contrast, in court litigation, a patent
challenger must establish the patent is invalid by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
10. See infra Part I.C.2.
11. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016) (“Parties
that initiate the [IPR] proceeding need not have a concrete stake in the outcome; indeed, they may lack constitutional standing.”).
12. See infra Part II.B.1.
13. See infra note 141.
14. See infra Part II.B.2.
15. See infra Part II.B.1.
16. A patent portfolio is a collection of patents owned by a single entity. The portfolio may include patents covering a range of related technologies or may cover a range
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challenged patent.17 In the second step, the patent challenger must establish its particularized injury by showing that its current designs
solve similar problems using similar solutions.18 Utilizing such an interpretation would enable non-infringing direct competitors to establish an injury in fact sufficient to meet the standing requirements, allowing competitors to proceed with their appeal of an adverse IPR
decision.
Part I of this Note discusses the patent examination process and
how current practice leads to the issuance of many invalid patents.
Part I then explores the threat these invalid patents pose to innovation
and why Congress established the various post-issuance proceedings,
including IPR, to help alleviate this problem. Part II outlines the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Article III standing requirements.
Part II then argues that the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of
the injury in fact requirement for patent challengers, specifically noninfringing direct competitors, appealing IPR decisions before the
PTAB is overly narrow and out of line with Supreme Court precedent.
Part III proposes an alternative interpretation, the DCS Test, for direct
competitors to satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing to
better recognize the injury in fact direct competitors face when an invalid patent precludes them from using technology that should otherwise be in the public domain. Under the DCS Test, a patent challenger
may establish that it is a direct competitor, and therefore suffers an
injury in fact, by demonstrating that it operates in the same field of
endeavor and that it has designs or products that solve similar problems using similar solutions as the challenged patent. This expanded
interpretation will help achieve Congress’s goal of reducing the number of invalid patents, mitigating the negative effects such patents
pose to innovation. An expanded interpretation will also help open
technology that was improperly taken out of the public domain for all
to use, spurring innovation for the technology of tomorrow.
I. THE PATENT EXAMINATION PROCESS CAN RESULT IN INVALID
ISSUED PATENTS
In recent years, the Patent Office has faced increasing criticism
that its current examination process may result in the issuance of low-

of unrelated technologies. Some patents in a portfolio may be used defensively, i.e., to
protect the entity from a potential infringement suit, while other patents may be actively practiced by the owning entity.
17. See infra Part III.A.2.b (discussing requirement 1).
18. See infra Part III.A.2.b (discussing requirement 2).
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quality19 patents that can stifle innovation. As several scholars note,
the Patent Office appears to be issuing more and more low-quality, invalid patents—patents that fail to meet one or more of the statutory
patentability requirements.20 This supposed quality problem has
reached a point that even the Patent Office itself recognizes it might
have a problem. In 2016, it commissioned a study from the Government Accountability Office to review its procedures and provide recommendations on how to produce higher quality patents.21 Allowing
the problem to continue to grow with the issuance of more invalid patents can create a patent thicket,22 forcing competitors to expend significant resources to avoid infringing these patents or face significant
infringement damages. This phenomenon can stifle innovation. To
help alleviate this potential problem, Congress established the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board to assess the validity of some of these patents
by enabling third parties to bring validity challenges under one or
more patentability grounds.23 While these proceedings have resulted
in the invalidation of many previously granted patents, if the Federal

19. The term “patent quality” is used to describe the strength with which a patent
meets the statutory patentability requirements. Because there is always some uncertainty as to whether a given invention is novel or nonobvious, these potential errors
can cause legal uncertainty and increase the costs for all others in working in related
technologies. See generally Quality of Patents, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www
.wipo.int/patents/en/topics/quality_patents.html [https://perma.cc/VHD6-C239].
20. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 34 (2004) (“[T]he granting of patents despite clear evidence of invalidity, in
the form of prior art that makes the invention not novel and/or obvious, has become
all too common.”); Roger A. Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 837 (2016)
(“[T]he empirical evidence shows clearly that examiners grant many invalid patents
and grant many patents with vague claims.”); Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent
Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 736 (2012) (“The patent system makes many mistakes,
frequently granting patents that should be denied and denying patents that should be
granted.”).
21. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE
SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS INCENTIVES, AND IMPROVE CLARITY 37–39 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
22. The “patent thicket” is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize
new technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (2000).
23. For background on what grounds can be raised of invalidity in the various
post-issuance proceedings, see generally AIA Trial Types Comparison Chart: Major Differences Between IPR, PGR, and CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto
.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/aia-trial
-types [https://perma.cc/X7TG-8NPV].
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Circuit allowed non-infringing direct competitors to establish standing on appeal of an IPR, the court might help to further mitigate the
effects of this patent quality problem.
A. THE PATENT EXAMINATION PROCESS FAVORS THE ISSUANCE OF PATENTS
Because of the constraints on the resources at the Patent Office,
the examination process can favor the issuance of patents, even if it
sometimes results in the issuance of invalid ones. Each year, the Patent Office receives approximately 600,000 utility patent applications.24 Around seventy-one percent of these applications eventually
issue as patents.25 Part of this high issuance rate is a result of the burden being on the Patent Office to prove an applicant’s invention unpatentable.26 Applicants have no affirmative duty to search the prior
art27 themselves, nor show why their application deserves a patent.28

24. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2018, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://
perma.cc/48DY-G7CK] (Apr. 2019).
25. Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan Marco, What Is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent?, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 203, 215 (2015); see also USPTO Grant Rates, PAT.
BOTS, https://www.patentbots.com/stats/uspto-grant-rates
[https://perma.cc/
7JQR-LWDL] (detailing patent grant rates by technology area). The Patent Office’s
most recent statistics show that it issued around 300,000 applications each year. See
supra note 24. This difference between applications received and the granting rate is
due to the multi-year latency period, i.e., the backup at the Patent Office. It can take
several years before a patent is even examined. So, while the Patent Office grants
300,000 patents, the number of applications is much lower than the 600,000 applications it received in the most recent year due to this latency.
26. See In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding that the
Patent Office “improperly shifted to [the applicant] the burden of proving patentability”); see also Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990,
997–1003 (2013).
27. “Prior art” is anything that is already in the public domain and includes anything “patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before” the applicant’s filing. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
28. In at least one study, the author concluded that “[a]pplicants routinely fail to
identify even their own previous patents [in their application], which suggests that, in
many cases, applicants do not conduct even cursory searches for prior art.” Bhaven N.
Sampat, When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.L. & ECON. 399, 401 (2010). The
author estimated that almost half of all applications failed to cite even the applicant’s
own relevant patents, suggesting the applicant conducted no prior art search. Id. at
404. Instead of having an affirmative duty to search the prior art, an applicant merely
has “a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty
to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2019). This duty merely requires that the applicant tell
the Office of materials that other patent offices use in evaluating their application and
other documents of which the applicant otherwise knows. It does not require seeking
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Instead, the burden is on the Patent Office examiner to produce evidence that the applicant does not deserve a patent by providing a thorough rationale supporting any rejection.29 With 600,000 applications
to process each year and only 9,600 patent examiners,30 examiners
must quickly and efficiently review each application.31
Examiners operate under extremely restrictive examination
times. On average, to meet their efficiency targets, examiners receive
a mere twenty-two hours to review an application from start to finish
(to issuance, abandonment, or final rejection).32 This includes reading
an applicant’s specification (which can be more than one hundred
pages), searching the prior art,33 formulating and writing any rejections to the application,34 conducting interviews with the applicant’s
attorney, and responding to any of the applicant’s arguments or
amendments in response to the examiner’s rejection.35 While the time
allotment is individually tailored to each application,36 over seventy
percent of examiners believe that the time they receive to review an
application is not enough to perform an adequate review.37 Because
out any new information. Applicants may do a search of the prior art themselves to
determine the claim scope in their application, but this is not required.
29. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (“In rejecting claims . . . the examiner must cite the best
references at his or her command. When a reference is complex or shows or describes
inventions other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must
be designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be clearly explained . . . .”).
30. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., FY2019 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
12 (2019) [hereinafter USPTO FY2019 REPORT].
31. After the Patent Office receives a patent application, a patent examiner employed by the Patent Office will review the application, review all of the prior art, and
determine whether the patent applicant is entitled to the patent. Upon first review, the
examiner will typically reject the application and require the patent applicant to narrow the scope of the claims to avoid what is already publicly known. This process is
known as patent prosecution and can take multiple rounds of back-and-forth with the
Patent Office before the applicant eventually receives their patent.
32. 2016 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 21, at 10. Another independent
study estimated that examiners receive on average nineteen hours to review an application. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Microlevel
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 552 (2017).
33. See supra note 27.
34. Rejections must “set forth a prima facie case of unpatentability” and include
supporting rationale and a clear articulation of the grounds of rejection. See MPEP, supra note 8, § 2103(VI).
35. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 32.
36. USPTO FY2019 REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
37. See 2016 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 21, at 25–26 (“[A]bout 70 percent of examiners have less time than needed to complete a thorough examination.”).
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of the constrained resources, the Patent Office essentially incentivizes
output instead of prioritizing quality.38 In other words, the combination of having to develop well-reasoned arguments to reject an application and the limited time to review an application makes it easier
for examiners to grant an application rather than to reject it.39
But only subjecting applications to a cursory review can result in
the issuance of invalid patents—those that do not meet the statutory
patentability requirements. A PTO review of its quality assurance
practices concluded that around four percent of patent examinations
included “unreasonable failure[] by the patent examiner to reject patent claims for one or more reasons provided in the patent laws.”40
Another researcher estimated that twenty-eight percent of currently
issued patents would be declared invalid if litigated.41 These patents
may be invalid for a number of reasons,42 but regardless of which statutory requirement it fails to meet, the consequences are the same. An
invalid patent can allow the patent owner to improperly exclude others from utilizing the technology, deterring competitors from practicing the invention and innovating on the backdrop of the patented technology.43 Granting this exclusionary right forces competitors to
expend resources to avoid potential infringement, stifling innovation.

38. See id. at 10 (“Examiners are rated based on their production, or the number
of examination tasks they perform, among other factors.”); see also Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1511 (2001) (“[M]oney
spent improving the PTO examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining
the ninety-five percent of patents that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that don’t crucially rely on the determination of validity.”).
39. Ford, supra note 20, at 838 (“[R]ejecting a patent application takes more work
than granting it.”); see also Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents? Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 645 (2015) (citing evidence that when examiners are
given less time to examine an application, they are more likely to allow claims than to
reject them).
40. OFF. OF AUDIT & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., FINAL REP. NO. OIG-15-026-A,
USPTO NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN PATENT QUALITY ASSURANCE PRACTICES 10 (2015).
41. Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 52 (2013). The difference
between this number and the Patent Office’s review is likely down to the standards
cited. The Patent Office used the standard of “unreasonable failure” in its review, while
the courts judge a patent’s validity by a clear and convincing evidence standard.
42. A patent may be invalid because it patented unpatentable subject matter, or
for failing to be useful, new, or nonobvious. See MPEP, supra note 8, §§ 2106–2107,
2131, 2141; cf. supra note 8.
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”).
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B. INVALID PATENTS CAN STIFLE INNOVATION
An invalid patent can stifle innovation and hurt direct competitors. Any patent, regardless of its validity, may be far more valuable
than the costs of obtaining the patent in the first place.44 The value
stems from the possibility that, even if invalid, a court or the PTAB
may uphold the validity of the patent.45 This provides the patent
owner the right to exclude others from “making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”46
But by improperly granting the patent and giving the owner the
right to exclude, an invalid patent can improperly restrict competition
and stifle innovation.47 Instead of remaining in the public domain as it
should, the technology is improperly recaptured and monopolized,
barring others from freely utilizing the technology.48 According to one
researcher, upon the invalidation of a single patent, citations to that
patent, on average, increased by fifty percent compared to pre-invalidation levels.49 In other words, once a patent was invalidated, innovation in that technology area increased by fifty percent.50 While the
44. See Ford, supra note 20, at 841.
45. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75,
80–83 (2005) (describing patents as “lottery tickets,” and that among the many applications inventors file, the hope is a few among the bunch are valuable).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
47. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 113–29 (2006) (discussing various ways that “mere possession” of an invalid patent can stifle innovation by hurting competition); see also Ofer
Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA:
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 723, 732–33 (2010) (“[T]here are numerous examples in which a
patent had a chilling effect on follow-on research and development in the relevant
field.”). For some such examples, see generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884–97 (1990).
48. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”).
49. Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation:
Causal Evidence from the Courts 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
20,269, 2014). The researchers examined the number of times that the patent was
cited by subsequent applications. Even though the patent was invalidated, it is still
prior art against later-filed applications. Thus, when there was a higher number of citations to that patent, the researchers concluded that more innovation occurred, i.e.,
more patents were filed in that similar technology area.
50. See id. at 27 (“Patent rights can shape the industrial structure of innovation
by impeding the entry of new innovators or the expansion of existing firms.”). A higher
number of citations to a patent presumably correlates to a higher amount of innovation
in a given technology space because subsequent patents will cite that invalidated patent as prior art.
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Constitution established the right to a limited monopoly to incentivize
innovation, if the Patent Office grants invalid patents covering technology already in the public domain, it can drastically slow the rate of
innovation and hurt the competitive market.51 In effect, these rights
“can have the perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation.”52
But trying to fix the problem on the front end by improving the
examination process may not be an efficient way to reduce the number, and alleviate the effects, of invalid patents. As some have properly
argued, because so few patents are later commercially valuable, for
the Patent Office to expend the resources to conduct a more “thorough” examination, and issue fewer invalid patents, would not justify
the heightened up-front expense.53 Recognizing the strain on resources, but still seeking to help mitigate any negative consequences
of invalid patents, Congress established several administrative postissuance proceedings, including IPR, to “provid[e] a more efficient system for challenging patents that should n[ever] have issued.”54
C. INTER PARTES REVIEW
In 2011, through the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA),
Congress established the inter partes review proceeding after recognizing “that questionable patents [were] too easily obtained and
[were] too difficult to challenge.”55 With this new proceeding, Congress sought to “broade[n] participation rights” of third-party patent

51. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 47, at 908 (“While there are exceptions,
where a few organizations controlled the development of a technology, technical advance appeared sluggish.”).
52. Shapiro, supra note 22.
53. The Patent Office operates solely off fees paid by applicants submitting for a
new patent and maintenance fees to maintain the rights of an issued patent through
its full term. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 5 (2019) [hereinafter USPTO 2020 JUSTIFICATION]. When an applicant submits an
application to the Patent Office, the initial fee covers the costs of the filing, search, and
examination. 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2019). Thus, since the Patent Office covers the costs of
examination through the collection of application fees, if the Office were to conduct a
more thorough examination with longer time-allotments per application, the fees
would inevitably increase accordingly. See also USPTO 2020 JUSTIFICATION, supra, at 17
(“The USPTO continues to conduct biennial fee reviews to ensure fees are aligned with
the full cost of the relevant products and services to the greatest extent possible.”).
While it may seem questionable to allow any invalid patents to issue, the balance of
keeping costs low to allow greater accessibility to patent rights makes economic sense.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011).
55. Id. at 39.
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challengers56 because often a patent challenger “ha[s] the most relevant prior art available and incentive to seek to invalidate an allegedly
defective patent.”57 By broadening participation rights, Congress
sought to create a more adversarial proceeding and help fix the shortcomings of the previous post-issuance proceedings.58
Congress’s first post-issuance review process, ex parte reexamination,59 established in 1981, allowed third parties to bring relevant
prior art of a particular patent to the attention of the Patent Office.60 If
the PTO concluded that the submitted prior art raised “a substantial
new question of patentability,”61 then the Patent Office reexamined
the patent to determine whether it should have been granted in the
first place. But ex parte reexamination proceeded without further input from the third party.62 In practice, this meant it followed “the same
inquisitorial process between patent owner and examiner as the initial Patent Office examination.”63 In other words, it followed the same
process that granted the allegedly invalid patent in the first place. Congress believed this process was inefficient and failed to alleviate the
problems invalid patents posed.64 In response, in 2000, Congress established inter partes reexamination to allow the third-party requester to further participate throughout the reexamination proceeding.65 However, in subsequent years, Congress concluded inter partes

56. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016).
57. H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 4 (2001).
58. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 45 (“The initial reexamination statute had several
limitations that later proved to make it a less viable alternative to litigation for evaluating patent validity than Congress intended . . . . [I]n the original reexamination system, the third-party challenger had no role once the proceeding was initiated, while
the patent holder had significant input throughout the entire process.”).
59. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 302.
61. Id. § 303.
62. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 18–19 (2008).
63. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 305).
64. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 45 (2011) (“A third party alleging a patent is invalid . . . had fewer challenges it could raise in the proceeding and, therefore, may instead
opt to risk infringement and litigate the validity of the patent in court.”); see also S. REP.
NO. 96-617, at 2 (1980) (“The present innovation and productivity lag is worsened by
distrust of the current patent system.”); Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 9–10 (1997) (discussing a “fundamental lack of trust in the competency of the
PTO to discover sources of relevant prior art and apply them properly under the statutory standards”).
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (“Each time that the patent owner files a response to an
action on the merits from the Patent and Trademark Office, the third-party requester
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reexamination was inefficient and needed revision.66 Thus, just over
ten years later, Congress established inter partes review to help further increase participation and incentivize competitors to challenge
allegedly invalid patents.
Inter partes review is a trial proceeding conducted before the
PTAB67 to review the validity of one or more claims of a previously
granted patent on the grounds of novelty and nonobviousness68 “on
the basis of prior art consisting of patents and printed publications.”69
Inter partes review has become widely popular. Since its inception in
late 2012, over 11,000 petitions have been filed to challenge the validity of various patents.70 In fiscal year 2019 alone, over 1,600 petitions
shall have one opportunity to file written comments addressing issues raised by the
action of the Office or the patent owner’s response thereto . . . .”).
66. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 19 (“Despite Congress’s attempts to improve the
reexamination system, it remains troublesomely inefficient and ineffective as a truly
viable alternative for resolving questions of patent validity.”).
67. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68. To initially obtain a patent, one must invent or discover something that is
“new and useful.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Once an applicant submits a patent application claiming what their “new and useful” invention is, a patent examiner at the Patent Office will
review the application to determine whether the invention is actually “new.” See 35
U.S.C. § 131. To be considered “new,” the invention must be both novel and nonobvious
over the prior art. Novelty is used to determine whether the applicant’s invention has
been previously disclosed, whether in a previous patent, printed publication, or other
disclosure to the public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. These types of disclosures form what is
known as prior art. To lack novelty, every element set forth in the application must be
set forth either expressly or inherently within a single prior art reference. Verdegaal
Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Nonobviousness considers whether the applicant’s invention as claimed would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art based on what is already known in the prior art. It considers whether “the difference between the new thing [claimed] and what was known
before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent.” Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 (1952)).
69. Inter Partes Review, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review
[https://perma.cc/3VVY-8GWN]. One thing to note is that third parties may only argue
invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 and only with printed publications and patents. If challenging the validity in court, the challenger may argue invalidity under
§ 101, unpatentable subject matter; § 112, indefiniteness, lack of enablement, or inadequate written description; or §§ 102 and 103 for being on-sale, in public use, or otherwise available to the public. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; see also Ryan Kenny, Which Invalidity
Avenue to Take: Inter Partes Review Versus Post-Grant Review, IP WATCHDOG (July 31,
2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/31/which-invalidity-avenue-ipr
-verses-post-grant-review [https://perma.cc/H2PC-YZUF]. Printed publications comprise mainly published patent applications, published eighteen months after filing of
the application, see 35 U.S.C. § 122, but also comprise trade journals, sales brochures,
or any other documents intended for the public.
70. PAT. TRIAL & APPEAL BD., TRIAL STATISTICS 3 (2020).
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were filed,71 a ten-fold increase compared to the previous post-issuance proceedings.72 This growing popularity is likely due to the proceeding’s relatively low cost and speed compared to normal district
court litigation.73 By allowing any third party to petition the PTAB to
institute review of a previously granted patent and providing the right
to appeal, Congress achieved its goal of increasing participation in
seeking to invalidate low-quality patents.74
1. Any Third Party May Petition to Institute an IPR Before the PTAB
In establishing IPR, Congress opened up patent validity challenges to more third parties, allowing any third party to bring such a
challenge, helping to provide a simpler, more efficient process to invalidate low-quality patents. For an IPR to begin, a third party (the patent challenger) must first file a petition with the Patent Office requesting the cancellation of one or more claims of another’s granted
patent.75 After receiving the petition, the Patent Office reviews the petition and determines whether it “shows that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
[one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”76 If the petition meets
this threshold, the Patent Office may institute an IPR to determine the
validity of the challenged claims.77 Once an IPR is instituted, the PTAB
has one year to carry out the proceedings and issue a final determination on the matter.78 The PTAB makes its final determination regarding the patentability of the challenged claims through a final written

71. Id. at 6, 8 (stating that 859 petitions were instituted, 510 were denied, and
259 were filed but settled prior to PTAB institution).
72. During the thirteen-year existence of inter partes reexamination, a total of
1,919 petitions were filed. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA–SEPTEBER [sic] 30, 2017 (2017).
73. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (requiring that the PTAB issue a final written decision within one year of the proceeding being instituted). This is compared to the median district court litigation timeline of over thirty months. Robert M. Siminski, Matthew L. Cutler & Bryan K. Wheelock, 6 Reasons Inter Partes Review Was Popular in 2013,
LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2013, 11:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/495709
[https://perma.cc/C3VQ-MSM8].
74. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 45–48 (2011); see also id. at 39–40 (detailing the
reasons for creating the IPR process, including “providing a more efficient system for
challenging patents that should not have issued . . . and reducing unwarranted litigation costs”).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 311.
76. Id. § 314(a).
77. See id.
78. Id. § 316(a)(11).
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decision.79 The PTAB may choose to invalidate all of the challenged
claims, some of the challenged claims, or conclude that all of the challenged claims are valid.80 By invalidating any of the claims, the PTAB
decision opens the technology for use by competitors and the general
public.
2. “Any” Party May Appeal an Adverse IPR Final Written Decision to
the Federal Circuit
While any party may petition the PTAB to institute an IPR, an appeal to the Federal Circuit still requires the challenging party to meet
the Article III standing requirements, leaving some challengers without the ability to appeal the PTAB decision. After an IPR proceeding
concludes with a final written decision, “[any] party dissatisfied with
the final written decision . . . may appeal the decision”81 to the Federal
Circuit and the Federal Circuit alone.82 Following a conclusion of the
IPR proceeding or a decision by the Federal Circuit, the patent challenger is estopped from challenging the validity of the same patent “on
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised
during that inter partes review,” either in a concurrent or subsequent
IPR, or in a later civil action.83 Because it is an agency proceeding, the
patent challenger does not need constitutional standing to file an IPR
or participate in the proceeding.84
Even though any party may appeal an adverse decision, the
PTAB’s written decision alone is not enough to confer standing on the
party.85 Any appellant seeking to invalidate another’s patent must still
satisfy the elements of Article III standing before the Federal Circuit.86
Thus, a patent challenger must establish that it suffers an adequate
injury in fact for its appeal to proceed. Because patent challengers may
79. Id. § 318(a).
80. See id.
81. Id. § 319.
82. Id. § 141.
83. Id. § 315(e). While the challenger may be estopped from arguing the same
grounds in a subsequent civil action, the Federal Circuit has not yet decided the issue
of whether this still applies to patent challengers unable to meet the standing requirements to appeal the case to the Federal Circuit. AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc.,
923 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
84. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016) (“Parties
that initiate the [IPR] proceeding need not have a concrete stake in the outcome; indeed, they may lack constitutional standing.”).
85. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that mere participation in the IPR and the potential estoppel provisions do not constitute an injury in fact).
86. See id.
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actively avoid infringing a direct competitor’s patent because of the
risk of significant infringement damages, meeting this requirement
can pose a significant obstacle to patent challengers seeking to appeal
the PTAB decision. Limiting the number of IPR appeals to the Federal
Circuit favors patent owners and can allow invalid patents to continue
to exist and stifle innovation.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STANDING TEST FOR PATENT
CHALLENGERS IN IPR APPEALS IS OVERLY RESTRICTIVE
In establishing inter partes review, Congress sought to broaden
the participation rights of third parties in challenges of previously issued patents by providing third parties a right to appeal.87 But to appeal the PTAB’s decision, the patent challenger must still satisfy the
Article III standing requirements. As discussed in this section, the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of standing in IPR appeals severely restricts the challenges brought by direct competitors. The Federal Circuit’s current requirements narrow the Supreme Court’s
constitutional requirements of standing and deviate from Congress’s
efforts to alleviate the problems of invalid patents by enabling competitors with “the most relevant prior art available and incentive to
seek to invalidate an allegedly defective patent”88 to proceed in an appeal of an adverse decision to the court.
A. ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIREMENTS
The Supreme Court has described Article III standing as a concept
used “to identify those disputes which [may be] appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”89 However, the courts can also
use standing as a gatekeeper to outright avoid deciding cases. This is
true of the Federal Circuit’s approach to standing of direct competitors appealing an adverse IPR decision. Under its current interpretation, the Federal Circuit protects patent owners from a court appeal
unless the patent challenger is actively infringing the patent, severely
limiting the ability of competitors to knock out invalid patents.90 This
can stifle innovation.
Upon a patent challenger’s appeal to the Federal Circuit, the patent challenger must meet the requirements of Article III.91 To satisfy
87. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 4 (2001).
88. Id.
89. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
90. See JTEKT, 898 F.3d at 1220.
91. Id. Because of Congress’s intent to grant broad participation rights in IPRs, the
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the requirements of Article III, a party must establish (1) an injury in
fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s
action, and (3) that it is “likely” that a favorable decision will redress
the plaintiff’s alleged injury in fact.92 In the context of patents, the causation and redressability elements are typically easily satisfied.93 Patent challengers meet the causation requirement because they are unable to use the patented technology and face a continual threat of
litigation due to the patent holder’s right to exclude.94 Challengers
meet the redressability requirement because if the court were to invalidate the patent on appeal, such action would allow the patent challenger to utilize the technology free of risk of infringement claims.95
Accordingly, the only element the Federal Circuit has so far used to
deny standing to a patent challenger is the injury in fact requirement.
However, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court’s outline of the injury in fact requirement narrowly in IPR appeals.96
1. The General Requirements to Establish an Injury in Fact
To meet the constitutional requirements of Article III standing, a
plaintiff must establish that they suffer an “injury in fact.”97 An injury
in fact occurs when there is “an invasion of a legally protected interest,” that is concrete, particularized to the plaintiff, and actual or imminent.98 If one of these elements is missing, a plaintiff has failed to
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.99 Despite direct competitors suffering a concrete, particularized injury, the Federal Circuit
has so far denied patent challengers seeking to establish Article III

prudential considerations of standing are most likely met, as the Federal Circuit has so
far not used them to deny standing to a patent challenger.
92. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
93. For element two, it is the patent owner’s monopoly that prohibits the patent
challenger from using the technology, therefore, there is a causal connection. For element three, if the court were to invalidate the patent, it would redress the challenger’s
injury by allowing them to utilize the technology free of risk of infringement damages.
94. See Leslie, supra note 47, at 113–29 (“The monopolist’s possession of a patent—even an invalid one—serves as a head on a pike.”).
95. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(holding that a patent holder is estopped from asserting validity of a patent that has
been previously declared invalid).
96. See infra Part II.B.
97. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 561 (stating that each element must be “supported in the same way
as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation”).
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standing unless they establish active infringement of the challenged
patent.100
a. The Injury Must Be Concrete, Not Hypothetical
Because of a patent’s preclusive effect, direct competitors suffer
a concrete injury when an invalid patent is permitted to exist. An injury is concrete if it actually exists and is “real” and not “abstract.”101
While the injury must actually exist, meeting the concreteness requirement does not require a plaintiff to easily prove or measure an
injury. A real risk of harm can satisfy the requirement of concreteness.
For example, in declaratory judgments, potential patent infringers are
able to satisfy the concreteness requirement even when they are only
in “reasonable apprehension of suit.”102 Even though the patent challenger is not subject to any current damages, courts have considered
“an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it
will face an infringement suit”103 as enough to constitute a concrete
injury. In other words, the potential of future infringement damages
is sufficient to establish a concrete injury.
b. The Injury Must Be Particularized
For an injury to be sufficiently particularized, it “must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”104 Thus, it cannot be merely
a generalized assertion that is true of all members of the public.105
This is one of the most significant requirements for a party to satisfy
when pleading standing in an appeal of an IPR because “raising only a
generally available grievance about [the] government—claiming only
harm to his and every citizen’s interest . . . and seeking relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large” does not adequately assert a particularized injury.106 However,
100. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
101. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
102. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
103. Id. (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1332–33 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
104. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
105. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (“[I]t is not sufficient
that [the plaintiff] has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.”
(quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937))). As stated by the Supreme Court,
“[v]indicating the public interest . . . is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
106. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74.
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as detailed in the next section, direct competitors do suffer a sufficiently particularized injury because they are operating in the same or
very similar design space, which inherently limits which patent challengers can satisfy the standing requirements.
c.

The Injury Must Be Actual or Imminent

To establish a suitable injury in fact, a plaintiff must further show
that it faces an actual or imminent risk upon which relief may be
granted.107 The plaintiff must assert either an injury they already sustained or an injury they face imminently.108 While imminence is not
strictly defined,109 courts have established that some future injury is
not enough to meet the injury in fact requirements.110 Thus, some future intention without something more suitably concrete is not
enough to meet the actual or imminence requirements.111 While in patent cases this usually requires the patent challenger to be producing
something utilizing the patented technology, patent challengers in an
IPR also meet this requirement when working to solve similar problems with similar solutions as the alleged invalid patent.112
2. Establishing a Sufficient Injury in Fact in Patent Cases
Patent cases pose a unique problem to the establishment of
standing because often parties seek to avoid infringing a competitor’s
patent due to the risk of infringement damages. Because of the unique
interests at stake in patent cases, the Supreme Court has been more
expansive in its interpretation of the injury in fact requirements for
patent challengers. Yet the Federal Circuit has incorrectly interpreted

107. Id. at 560.
108. Id. at 575 (“[T]o entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action . . . .” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. at 634)).
109. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative . . . that the injury
is certainly impending.” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2)).
110. See id. at 401 (“[F]uture injury is too speculative to satisfy the well-established
requirement that threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”).
111. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
112. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“[W]here the party relies on potential infringement liability as a basis for injury in
fact, but is not currently engaging in infringing activity, it must establish that it has
concrete plans for future activity that creates a substantial risk of future infringement
or likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of infringement.”).
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the Supreme Court’s precedent and has adopted an overly narrow approach to Article III standing. The Supreme Court, in its relatively few
patent cases examining standing, recognized that the threat of infringement damages and a possible injunction113 can force competitors to avoid practicing an invention, even if competitors believe the
patent is invalid.114 Accordingly, just because the competitor seeking
to invalidate a patent has not actively infringed the patent does not
preclude it from establishing Article III standing. Additionally, the
Court has recognized that competitors possess a concrete interest in
definitively knowing whether a patent is invalid, and a court should
decide the challenge.
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,115 the Supreme Court held
that a patent challenger does not need to actively infringe the challenged patent to meet the injury in fact requirements sufficient to establish Article III standing.116 As discussed in the next section, contrary to the MedImmune decision, the Federal Circuit imposes this
exact requirement on patent challengers appealing an adverse IPR decision.117
MedImmune had entered into a licensing agreement for the right
to “make, use, and sell” products covered by an issued Genentech patent, and a second, then-pending, Genentech patent application.118
When the then-pending patent application later issued as a patent,
MedImmune concluded that it did not owe royalties on that patent because the patent was “invalid and unenforceable,” and alternatively,
that MedImmune’s products did not infringe the Genentech patent.119
Fearing litigation, MedImmune filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking to invalidate Genentech’s patent.120 However, while the litigation was ongoing, MedImmune continued to pay royalties to Genentech for the patent it sought to invalidate.121 Genentech moved to dismiss MedImmune’s declaratory action, arguing that because
MedImmune continued to pay royalties, it was not at risk of an infringement action.122 In other words, by continuing to pay royalties,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 137.
See infra Part II.B.1.
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 121.
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 128.
Id.
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MedImmune’s “own acts . . . eliminate[d] the threat of harm” and
“ma[de] what would otherwise be an imminent threat at least remote,
if not nonexistent.”123
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that continuing to pay royalties
under the licensing agreement did not preclude MedImmune from establishing Article III standing.124 The Court asserted that “[t]he rule
that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here)
risk treble damages . . . finds no support in Article III.”125 In other
words, the Supreme Court established that a patent challenger need
not actively infringe the challenged patent, exposing itself to treble
damages and an injunction, to be able to challenge the validity of an
issued patent in the courts.126 Under its current interpretation, the
Federal Circuit fails to recognize this decision, and instead requires
that a patent challenger appealing an adverse IPR decision must show
that it is actively at risk of an infringement action to satisfy the injury
in fact requirements of Article III.127
In another Supreme Court decision, Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., the Court recognized that in some circumstances, even when a patent challenger is no longer at risk of an infringement action, the challenger may still have an interest in
invalidating a patent and may still satisfy the standing requirements
of Article III.128 In its decision, the Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s long-standing practice of dismissing a defendant’s declaratory
judgment action challenging the validity of a patent following an adjudication that the defendant was not infringing the patent.129 The Court
concluded that even if a patent challenger’s activity has already been
adjudicated as non-infringing, and there is no longer a risk of an infringement action, a court may still decide the validity of the asserted
patent in a co-pending declaratory judgment action.130 The Court reasoned that the “validity [challenge of the patent] has greater public
123. Id.
124. Id. at 137.
125. Id. at 134.
126. See id.
127. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir.
2014)) (holding that the patent challenger failed to establish Article III standing because the design of its product was not certain enough to potentially infringe the challenged patent).
128. Cardinal Chem. Co., v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993).
129. Id. at 101–02; see Vieau v. Japax, 823 F.2d 1510 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Fonar Corp.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
130. Cardinal Chem Co., 508 U.S. at 98.
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importance” than the conclusion of non-infringement and therefore
cannot preclude a court from inquiring fully into the validity of a patent.131 Thus, even though the patent challenger was not infringing the
patent, it could still proceed with a validity challenge of the patent in
a separate declaratory judgment action.132 There was no requirement
that a party “have any duty to disclose its future plans,” to show that
it would face a future infringement action, because the validity of the
patent “imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who are convinced
that a patent [i]s . . . invalid.”133
These two decisions make clear that a patent challenger does not
need to face current liability to a patent owner to meet the concrete,
particularized, and actual requirements needed to establish an injury
in fact and Article III standing. In contrast, in deciding patent challengers’ assertion of standing during appeal of an adverse IPR decision, the
Federal Circuit requires exactly that, as discussed in the next Section.
The Federal Circuit fails to recognize that the validity of a patent “imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who are convinced that a patent [i]s . . . invalid,”134 which establishes a concrete, particularized,
and actual injury in fact.
B. FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS DECIDING STANDING UPON IPR APPEAL
Because Congress established a low bar to petition the PTAB to
institute an IPR and challenge the validity of a patent,135 not every
party has standing to appeal an adverse decision to the Federal Circuit.136 Meeting the requirements of standing as a patent owner on appeal is simple to satisfy. If a patent owner has one or more claims invalidated through an adverse IPR decision, it can establish that its
injury in fact is concrete and particularized because it has potentially
lost its patent rights.137 The patent owner may even establish an injury

131. Id. at 100 (quoting Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327,
330 (1945)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 100–01.
134. Id. at 101.
135. In actuality, a party in an IPR challenges the individual claims of a patent rather than the patent as a whole. For simplicity, this Note will discuss a patent challenger as if they are challenging the patent as a whole rather than the specific claims
of the patent. While the proper way to frame the issue would be to discuss only challenging the claims, it can make the discussion more confusing and take away focus
from the proper issue, a party’s assertion of an injury in fact.
136. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016).
137. See Sony Corp. v. Iancu, 924 F.3d 1235, 1238 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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in fact after the patent term has expired.138 In contrast, for a patent
challenger, establishing an injury in fact can be significantly more difficult.139 Even though by statute “a party dissatisfied with the final
written decision . . . may appeal the decision,”140 that does not eliminate need to satisfy the injury in fact requirements.141 No matter what
rights Congress confers on a party, “the requirement of injury in fact
is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”142 However, under the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation to
establish an injury in fact, the patent challenger cannot be merely a
direct competitor.143 It must show it is either currently subject to an
infringement suit or that it is engaged in conduct that will almost certainly give rise to a possible infringement suit.144

138. A patent holder has an interest in the validity of a patent’s claims for up to six
years following the patent’s expiration because, under the statute of limitations, it can
still serve as a basis for an infringement claim. See id. (dismissing the dissent’s argument that even though the challenged patent had already expired, the patent owner
still had satisfied the case or controversy requirement of Article III); see also Benjamin
R. Holt, Article III Standing for an IPR Appeal Despite Patent Expiration and No Pending
Litigation, ROTHWELL FIGG, https://www.ptablaw.com/2019/06/04/article-iii
-standing-for-an-ipr-appeal-despite-patent-expiration-and-no-pending-litigation
[https://perma.cc/QPG8-VWU3] (“[The Federal Circuit] found a controversy sufficient
to satisfy Article III for the patent owner’s appeal despite the fact that the patent at
issue had expired.”).
139. See Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he exercise of its right to appeal does not necessarily establish that it possesses
Article III standing.”); see also Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753
F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The statute d[oes] not guarantee a particular outcome favorable to the requester.”).
140. 35 U.S.C. § 319.
141. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44; see also JTEKT Corp. v. GKN
Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) “cannot
be read to dispense with the Article III injury-in-fact requirement for appeal to [the
Federal Circuit]”). Section 141(c), similar to § 319, states that “[a] party to an inter
partes review . . . who is dissatisfied with the final written decision of the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board . . . may appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” 35 U.S.C. § 141(c).
142. Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009)).
143. For an early discussion of why non-competitors, and specifically public interest groups, should have the ability to appeal IPR challenges of invalid patents to the
Federal Circuit, see generally Sapna Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 87 (2017). Professor Kumar’s discussion pre-dated many of the cases discussed here, in which the Federal Circuit severely limited even competitors’ abilities
to challenge invalid patents.
144. JTEKT Corp., 898 F.3d at 1220–21.
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1. Active Infringement or Concrete Plans to Infringe Establish an
Adequate Injury in Fact
The simplest, most straightforward way a patent challenger may
establish an injury in fact following an adverse IPR decision is by
showing that it is actively infringing the patent and is subject to an
infringement suit.145 It is estimated that around eighty percent of the
IPR petitions filed each year are filed in response to assertions of infringement in district court litigation.146 Instead of going through
costly litigation in district court, the patent challenger may opt to challenge the validity in an IPR,147 helping to expedite litigation.148 But if
the patent challenger loses its invalidity challenge in the IPR, it still
meets the injury in fact requirements because it faces the risk of infringement damages in the district court action and may appeal the
decision.149 This is directly in line with Supreme Court precedent.
145. See, e.g., Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“Aylus sued Apple for infringement of the ’412 patent. Apple then filed two separate petitions for inter partes review with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, each
challenging different claims of the ’412 patent.”); GoPro, Inc. v. 360Heros, Inc., No.
IPR2018-01754 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 3, 2019) (discussing whether the PTAB could decide the
merits of the IPR challenge after GoPro was sued for infringement, “[360Heros] argues,
‘[GoPro] failed to file an IPR petition within the statutory one year deadline of being
served with a counterclaim of infringement’”).
A party may choose to file an IPR challenging the claims of the asserted patent
to lower the costs of litigation as well as expedite review of the patent. An IPR, while
allowing for fewer grounds of invalidity challenges, is significantly cheaper and faster
as the PTAB must issue a final written decision within eighteen months.
146. Pedram Sameni, Patexia Insight 44: Eighty Percent of IPR Filings Are for Defensive Purposes, PATEXIA (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.patexia.com/feed/patexia-chart
-44-80-percent-of-ipr-filings-are-for-defensive-purposes-20171107 [https://perma
.cc/4QNS-VDF3].
147. See AIPLA, AIPLA 2019 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 56, 61 (2019) (reporting compiled costs of patent infringement litigation when less than $1 million at stake
totaling more than $725,000 through appeal, while reporting costs of an IPR through
appeal of $443,000); 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“An inter partes review may not be instituted
if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on
which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a
complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”).
148. See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Hilti, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 1032, 1038 (E.D.
Wis. 2015) (“[I]f . . . some claims are invalidated or canceled [during the IPR], then the
[c]ourt and the parties will not have to address the validity or infringement of those
claims.”); Evolutionary Intel. LLC v. Yelp Inc, No. C-13-03587, 2013 WL 6672451, at *6
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[I]f the PTAB cancels all of the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents, this action will be rendered moot. Should the PTAB cancel or narrow any of the
asserted claims of the Asserted Patents, the scope of this litigation may be significantly
simplified.”).
149. See John Marlott, Do Only Certain IPR Petitioners Have Standing to Appeal Adverse PTAB Decisions?, PTAB LITIG. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www
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However, when the patent challenger is not the subject of an infringement suit, under the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation, the
patent challenger must establish an injury in fact by showing that it is
either actively infringing the challenged patent or has imminent plans
to infringe.150 The challenger may not simply assert that it plans to use
the challenged patent. Instead, it must show that is either already
practicing the challenged claims, or that it is far enough in its plans to
practice the claims that it is near certain it will practice the challenged
claims.151 While the Federal Circuit has properly interpreted Supreme
Court precedent to allow infringing patent challengers to sufficiently
assert standing, the Federal Circuit overly limits its interpretation of
what constitutes an injury in fact when a patent challenger has yet to
actively infringe the allegedly invalid patent.
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V.,152 the Federal Circuit followed Supreme Court precedent and held that when a patent
challenger will concretely practice the challenged claims and actively
infringe the claims, it satisfies the Article III standing requirements.153
The patent challenger suffers an injury in fact by being precluded from
use of the patented technology. The Federal Circuit concluded that the
patent challenger (DuPont) adequately established that it had concrete plans to practice the claims of the challenged patent.154 DuPont
submitted a declaration in which it asserted that it had publicly announced a plan to build a production plant that, according to three scientists hired by DuPont, was “capable of operating under conditions
.ptablitigationblog.com/do-only-certain-ipr-petitioners-have-standing-to-appeal
-adverse-ptab-decisions [https://perma.cc/4CLM-4P68] (“[I]f the litigation-defendant-petitioner loses at the PTAB, there is no question about the petitioner’s standing
to appeal the PTAB’s adverse decision to the Federal Circuit, because the petitioner is
facing live claims of infringement of the patent in a district court action.”).
150. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“[A] petitioner who appeals from an IPR decision need not face ‘a specific threat
of infringement litigation by the patentee’ to establish jurisdiction.” (quoting ABB Inc.
v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011))); see also JTEKT Corp. v.
GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Our cases establish that typically in order to demonstrate the requisite injury in an IPR appeal, the appellant/petitioner must show that it is engaged or will likely engage ‘in an[] activity that would
give rise to a possible infringement suit.’” (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni
Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014))).
151. See Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(concluding that the patent challenger did not assert adequate facts to establish that it
would infringe the challenged patent).
152. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 904 F.3d 996.
153. Id. at 1005.
154. Id. (“[W]e conclude that DuPont has satisfied the injury in fact requirement
for Article III standing.”).
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within the claimed ranges of the [challenged] patent.”155 DuPont filed
its IPR in August of 2015156 and the production plant became operational in early 2018.157 Despite this nearly three-year delay, because
DuPont had shown a “significant ‘involvement in research [and] commercial activities involving’ the claimed subject matter of the [challenged] patent,” it still met the injury in fact requirements.158 Properly
following Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded
that DuPont adequately established its injury in fact because it had
concrete “plans to take . . . action that would implicate the [challenged]
patent.”159
However, in its decision in JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd.,
the Federal Circuit failed to follow Supreme Court precedent and held
that the patent challenger (JTEKT) failed to satisfy the injury in fact
requirements because it was not actively infringing the challenged patent.160 The Federal Circuit concluded that while JTEKT was working
in the same technology area and seeking to solve similar problems
with its developmental designs, it failed to establish that it was injured
by the challenged patent.161 However, as described in further detail in
the next section, direct competitors working in the same technology
do suffer an injury in fact caused by the preclusive effect of a patent.
What the Federal Circuit failed to recognize, but the Court outlined in
MedImmune and Cardinal Chemical, is that an invalid patent forces direct competitors to expend resources to first, learn of the patents, and
second, to ensure they avoid possible claims of infringement by designing around these patents.162
In the case, JTEKT submitted two declarations supporting its assertion of standing based on its plans to practice the claims of the challenged patent.163 However, the Federal Circuit concluded that JTEKT’s
declarations failed to show that its planned design “would create a
155. Id. at 1003.
156. Petition for Inter Partes Review, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V.,
No. IPR2015-01838, 2015 WL 5666096 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2015).
157. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 904 F.3d at 1004. Additionally, DuPont did not
publicly announce its plans for the production plant until 2016. Id.
158. Id. at 1005 (first alteration in original) (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis.
Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen,
Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
160. JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
161. Id.
162. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); Cardinal Chem.
Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
163. JTEKT Corp., 898 F.3d at 1221.
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substantial risk” of infringing the challenged patent.164 The Federal
Circuit formed this conclusion largely on JTEKT’s concession that it
had not yet finalized its design which it asserted posed a direct infringement risk.165 JTEKT’s Chief Engineer stated that its designed
product “will continue to evolve and may change until it is completely
finalized.”166 Yet providing a finality of judgment about the potential
invalidity of a patent is exactly what the Supreme Court upheld in Cardinal Chemical.167 If the Federal Circuit provided an invalidity judgment, then JTEKT could incorporate the patent’s technology in its design without risk of future infringement damages. While JTEKT’s
design may have still been in progress, the remaining patent still
forced JTEKT to design around it. Despite this, the Federal Circuit concluded that JTEKT’s declarations merely stated a general grievance,
and therefore it did not suffer a concrete injury,168 contrary to Court
precedent.169
In essence, if a patent challenger is not subject to an active suit
for infringement, to satisfy the concrete and particularized requirements of asserting an injury in fact, under the Federal Circuit’s current
approach, a patent challenger must establish that is either actively
practicing the patented claims or is definitively going to practice the
invention in the very near future.170 However, in order to avoid being
subject to treble damages or a possible injunction in a future infringement suit, many patent challengers choose not to practice the claimed
invention. But under its current interpretation, the Federal Circuit has
denied recognizing a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury by
direct competitors unless they show that they are actively infringing
the patent, contrary to the Supreme Court’s precedent.
2. Direct Competition Does Not Establish an Adequate Injury in
Fact
As an alternative to showing active infringement, some patent
challengers have attempted to assert that as competitors to the owners of the challenged patent, they are limited in what designs they can
164. Id.
165. See id. (“JTEKT expressly conceded that ‘no product is yet finalized.’”).
166. Id.
167. See Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 102–03.
168. JTEKT Corp., 898 F.3d at 1221.
169. See Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 100–03.
170. See JTEKT Corp., 898 F.3d at 1221 (“[The patent challenger] must establish
that it has concrete plans for future activity that creates a substantial risk of future
infringement or likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of infringement.”).
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produce, and therefore suffer an injury in fact.171 So far, the Federal
Circuit has denied such claims on the grounds that they fail to meet
the concrete requirements of an injury. This is in contrast to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Cardinal Chemical that the potential validity of a patent “imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who are
convinced that a patent [i]s . . . invalid”172 and can utilize the technology in their own designs. The Federal Circuit’s decisions interpreting
a competitor’s standing has thus far failed to recognize this.
In AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., the Federal Circuit denied AVX’s assertion of standing on the grounds of being a direct competitor of Presidio,173 despite the Supreme Court’s explicit recognition
that direct competitors suffer “ongoing burdens” from the presence of
an allegedly invalid patent in Cardinal Chemical.174 AVX submitted
several declarations detailing the competitive nature of the two companies, noting that “since 2008, there ha[d] been four district court
actions between AVX and Presidio involving potential infringement of
various capacitor patents.”175 AVX claimed that this established that
the two companies competed in the same market and this resulted in
a “substantial” threat of future infringement litigation.176 However,
the Federal Circuit concluded that this was merely speculative and not
sufficient to establish Article III standing.177
Similarly, the Federal Circuit ignored the Court’s recognition that
direct competitors face “ongoing burdens” and suffer an injury sufficient for courts to grant patent challengers Article III standing in General Electric Co. v. United Technologies Corp.178 GE sought to establish
standing on the basis that first, it researched a design that implicated
the United Technologies (UTC) patent, and second, that as a direct
competitor of UTC, UTC’s patent impeded its ability to design new

171. As discussed in the next Section, as long as the direct competitor operates in
the same field of endeavor and it has designs or products that solve similar problems
with similar solutions, this should be enough to meet the Supreme Court’s standard of
Article III standing.
172. Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 101.
173. AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., 923 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
174. Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 101.
175. AVX Corp., 923 F.3d at 1360.
176. Id. at 1361.
177. See id. at 1365 (“AVX’s suspicion that Presidio would assert the upheld claims
against AVX if it had a reasonable basis for doing so does not mean that there is any
reasonable basis right now.” (internal citation omitted)).
178. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 928 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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commercial aircraft engines.179 GE first alleged it researched an engine design that “would potentially implicate [UTC’s] 605 Patent,” expending resources to develop a design for a contract bid proposal.180
The Federal Circuit concluded that this assertion failed to allege a sufficient injury in fact.181 GE could not simply allege that it “expended
some unspecified amount of time and money to consider engine designs that could potentially implicate the [challenged] patent.”182 Second, GE asserted that as one of the three major turbine engine manufacturers directly competing with UTC, UTC’s patent impeded its
ability to use its own 1970s turbofan engine design as a basis to develop its future designs.183 GE asserted that this forced it to design
around UTC’s patent, “restrict[ing] GE’s design choices” and forcing it
to “incur additional research and development expenses.”184 But the
Federal Circuit again concluded that this failed to establish an adequate injury in fact because GE must still have a “nonspeculative interest in engaging in conduct . . . covered by the patent claims at issue.”185 However, because GE is solving similar problems with similar
solutions, as described in the next Part, GE sufficiently meets the Supreme Court’s requirements of Article III standing.
These recent Federal Circuit cases show that unless a direct competitor is actively infringing the challenged patent, it will be difficult
to establish Article III standing. As currently interpreted, for a noninfringing direct competitor to adequately establish its standing before the court, it must “allege[] current or nonspeculative activities of
its own that arguably fall within the scope of the upheld claims.”186
179. Id. at 1352.
180. Id. at 1353 (alteration in original).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1352.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1354 (quoting AVX Corp. v. Presidio Components, Inc., 923 F.3d 1357,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. AVX Corp., 923 F.3d at 1367. Patent challengers have also attempted to use
the various statutory provisions to assert an injury in fact, though to no avail. The Federal Circuit concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) merely establishes that a party is “permitted to file its appeal,” not that it has the definitive right to. Phigenix, Inc. v. Immunogen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). Additionally, the Federal Circuit concluded that
§ 315(e), which bars a patent challenger from “assert[ing] either in a civil action . . .
that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could
have raised during that inter partes review” also cannot serve as a basis for an injury
in fact. AVX Corp., 923 F.3d at 1362. The court went on to say that the court had not yet
decided whether the estoppel provision would apply to cases when the IPR challenger
lacked standing to appeal the decision. Id. at 1363.
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However, as discussed in the next Part, this interpretation is overly
limiting of the Supreme Court’s interpretation and fails to recognize
Congress’s intent to alleviate the patent quality problem.
III. A PROPOSED TEST TO ALLOW DIRECT COMPETITORS TO
ESTABLISH ARTICLE III STANDING IN IPR APPEALS
The Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of what constitutes
an injury in fact for non-infringing direct competitors appealing an adverse IPR decision is overly restrictive of what the Supreme Court detailed in MedImmune and Cardinal Chemical. While the Federal Circuit
attempts to use Article III standing to deny non-infringing direct competitors the right to appeal an adverse IPR decision, it does so by failing to recognize that direct competitors are injured when they are precluded from utilizing technology that should otherwise be in the
public domain. This injury should be recognized by the Federal Circuit. If the Patent Office improperly issued a patent in the first place,
this can result in an undeserved monopoly, stifling innovation. While
the Federal Circuit has thus far used standing to deny non-infringing
direct competitors the chance to appeal an adverse IPR decision, as
discussed below, direct competitors do suffer an injury in fact sufficient to meet the concrete and particularized requirements of Article
III standing.
In establishing the Federal Circuit in 1982, Congress sought to increase the strength of the U.S. patent system for patent owners.187
Many of the Federal Circuit’s decisions succeeded in doing just this.
However, like several of the Federal Circuit’s other decisions later
overturned by the Supreme Court for being overly restrictive on patent challengers and overly relaxed on patent applicants and owners,188 the Federal Circuit’s approach to direct competitor standing is
overly narrow, keeping worthy patent challenges from reaching the
187. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2224 (2000) (“[T]he creation of the Federal
Circuit had a clear substantive agenda: to strengthen patents.”).
188. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s narrow view of the patent eligibility exceptions
dealing with laws of nature); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test in determining patent eligibility); KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “rigid approach” to the obviousness inquiry which limited obviousness rejections to instances
when the prior art contained an explicit “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39 n.7 (2011) (discussing other Supreme Court
decisions overturning the Federal Circuit to improve patent quality and make determining patent validity more efficient).
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courts. A patent challenger should not have to “bet the farm, or . . . risk
treble damages,” to challenge the validity of a patent.189 In contrast to
the Federal Circuit’s current holdings, truly direct competitors suffer
an injury in fact and have the “incentive to seek to invalidate an allegedly defective patent” specifically because they are subject to the preclusive effect of such a patent.190 To overcome the Federal Circuit’s
failure to recognize this injury, a new test, the Direct Competitor
Standing Test (DCS Test) is proposed to allow direct competitors to
establish an injury in fact in an IPR appeal.
A. TRULY DIRECT COMPETITORS SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE III
STANDING
The proposed DCS Test, discussed in detail in this Section, recognizes the Supreme Court’s expansive approach to injuries in fact in patent cases while ensuring the patent challenger still meets the concrete and particularized requirements of an injury in fact. Following
the outline of the DCS Test, several exemplary cases demonstrate how
this test might be implemented. The DCS Test recognizes that direct
competitors do suffer an injury in fact because the preclusive effect of
a potentially invalid patent imposes “ongoing burdens” on their actions, limiting their use of the technology.191 This expanded interpretation allows competitors that truly compete in the same technology
and suffer a concrete and particularized injury to establish standing
while excluding those “competitors” that only seek to invalidate another’s patent. While both suffer a concrete injury, the proposed solution ensures that only true competitors, even if non-infringing, can establish standing by limiting standing to competitors that are
particularly injured: those either actively using the patented technology or directly competing in the specific patented technology. The DCS
Test also enables more competitors, specifically non-infringing competitors, suffering from the Patent Office’s patent quality problem to
meet the standing requirements to appeal an adverse IPR decision to
the Federal Circuit and alleviate the negative effects of the invalid patent.

189. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134 (2007).
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 4 (2001).
191. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 101 (1993).
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1. Competitors Suffer a Concrete Injury When Precluded from
Using the Patented Technology
When a patent owner obtains an invalid patent, direct competitors suffer a concrete injury because they are precluded from utilizing
technology that should otherwise remain in the public domain. Upon
obtaining a patent, the patent owner has the right to exclude others
from “making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States.”192 A patent does not confer on the patent holder the affirmative right to practice their invention.193 Instead, it merely regulates the
conduct of all others, prohibiting others from practicing the invention
without being liable to the patent owner for treble damages and/or an
injunction.194 Thus, when a patent holder obtains a patent, it is not the
holder’s personal use which is regulated, but instead, everyone else’s
use of the patent that is regulated.
Additionally, during an IPR, the patent challenger can only assert
that the patent is invalid under novelty and nonobviousness
grounds.195 In other words, the patent challenger is challenging the
patent on the grounds that the technology is already in the public domain, free to be used by anyone. The public at large, including competitors of the challenged patent, have the right to use knowledge in the
public domain, free of restrictions.196 When the patent owner though

192. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
193. See Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 878, 879 n.2
(1991). Some patents can “block” an earlier issued patent when it is an improvement
on the device. To practice the earlier patent, the party may need to obtain a license to
this “blocking patent.” See Prima Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
194. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.”); id. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claiming the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention . . . .”); id. § 283 (“The
several courts . . . may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent . . . .”).
195. See id. § 311(b) (identifying that a patent may only be challenged in an IPR on
grounds permissible under Sections 102 and 103).
196. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 65 (1998) (“The patent laws
therefore seek [] to protect the public’s right to retain knowledge already in the public
domain . . . .”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (“An unpatentable article . . . is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever
chooses to do so.”); see also Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408 (2015)
(noting that when an invention is in the public domain, “every person can make free
use” of that invention).
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is able to assert an invalid patent and preclude competitors from utilizing the patented technology, it destroys the competitor’s right to
use knowledge in the public domain.
As the Federal Circuit has thus far concluded that patent challengers appealing an IPR fail to assert an injury in fact,197 the Federal Circuit ignores (1) that it is all others, including competitors, whose conduct is regulated, and (2) that competitors have a concrete interest in
utilizing technology that was improperly taken out of the public domain through the invalid patent. In denying standing to patent challengers, the Federal Circuit allows the allegedly invalid patent to
“serve[] as a head on a pike,” and prevent any researcher, inventor, or
manufacturer from using the technology.198
One important point should be addressed again here. While in
district court any patent can be challenged, in an IPR there must be a
“reasonable likelihood” that at least one of the claims in the challenged
patent is invalid, otherwise the PTAB cannot institute review.199 Thus,
while the Federal Circuit must decide whether the challenged patent
is injuring direct competitors, for an IPR to be instituted, the PTAB
must have already concluded that there was a “reasonable likelihood”
that the patent was invalid and therefore improperly injuring competitors.
Essentially, any direct competitor wishing to work in the same
design area of the challenged patent has three options, all of which injure the competitor. First, the direct competitor could avoid practicing
the invention by designing around200 the claimed features of the patent. In this instance, the competitor’s conduct is being directly regulated by the patent because it precludes the competitor from practicing the patented technology and forces them to expend resources to
avoid the patent.201 Second, the party could obtain a license from the

197. See supra Part II (analyzing the Federal Circuit’s position on standing in IPR
appeals).
198. Leslie, supra note 6, at 115.
199. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
200. Designing around the patent means that the competitor will avoid using all of
the features covered by the technology to ensure it is not subject to infringement damages without compromising the usability or marketability of the product or service.
See Brian Moran & Benjamin Jensen, Designing Around a Patent as an Alternative to a
License, IP WATCHDOG (July 30, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/30/
designing-around-patent-alternative-license [https://perma.cc/2MN3-NMZJ].
201. See id. (discussing how a competitor may attempt to avoid infringing a patent,
and noting that even attempting to design around the patent “will not necessarily guarantee a safe harbor”).
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patent owner for use of the patented features.202 In this circumstance,
the party’s conduct is directly regulated by whatever rights the patent
owner confers to the licensee, whether it is an exclusive license or
merely a license to use.203 Lastly, the party could ignore the patent
owner’s patent altogether and practice the invention for themselves
anyway. Under this situation, the party may be liable to the patent
owner for damages.204 Damages can include up to treble damages if
the court deems it reasonable205 and/or an injunction.206
In all three of these situations, a competitor’s conduct is regulated
by the presence of a patent, establishing a concrete injury.207 When
the Patent Office issues an invalid patent, that concrete injury becomes more pronounced because a direct competitor would be able
to practice the patented invention but for the Patent Office’s error.208
A competitor is concretely injured when it is unable to practice the
(invalidly) patented invention, is (improperly) paying licensing fees to
avoid a suit for damages, or is actually subject to an (unjustified) infringement lawsuit. The only way to know whether a patent is invalid
is through fully litigating it.209

202. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 127–28 (identifying the role of licensing in infringement dispute resolution).
203. See id.
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
205. A party may be liable for treble damages in cases when they willfully infringe
the patent. See Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“It is well-settled [sic] that enhancement of damages must be premised on willful infringement or bad faith.”). Such situations arise when the party (1) engaged in
acts that infringed on the patent; and (2) the party knew the acts were in violation of
the patent. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(detailing circumstances considered to be willful infringement and creating a predicate for an award of punitive damages).
206. See 35 U.S.C. § 283.
207. See supra Part II.A.1.
208. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”); see
also supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the right to use knowledge in
the public domain).
209. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011) (“‘While the
ultimate question of patent validity is one of law’ . . . the same factual questions underlying the PTO’s original examination of a patent application will also bear on an invalidity defense in an infringement action . . . .” (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 17)).
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2. Competitors Suffer a Particularized Injury by Competing in the
Same Technology
Although everyone except the patent owner is regulated through
the issuance of a patent,210 it would be far too broad to grant standing
to every individual who is not the patent owner in a potential suit.
Thus, under the proposed DCS Test, a patent challenger appealing an
adverse IPR decision must show that it is truly a direct competitor to
the patented technology, establishing that its injury is sufficiently particularized (and further establishing the concreteness of the injury).
This proposed test better aligns with the Supreme Court’s expansive
approach of standing in patent cases, recognizing that a patent’s validity “imposes ongoing burdens on competitors.”211 The DCS Test captures the injury that direct competitors, even non-infringing competitors, face by the preclusive effect of a patent.
Under the proposed interpretation of standing, a patent challenger may establish an injury in fact in one of two ways. In the first
prong, a patent challenger may establish injury in fact by showing that
it is actively infringing or will imminently infringe the patent it seeks
to invalidate.212 The second, alternative prong is the DCS Test. Under
this test, if the patent challenger is unable to establish that it is actively
infringing the challenged patent, it may show a particularized injury
by establishing that it is a direct competitor to the specific patented
technology.
a. Prong One: Active Infringement Establishes a Concrete &
Particularized Injury
In the first prong, a patent challenger may establish a concrete
and particularized injury by establishing that it is either (1) currently
subject to an infringement suit, or (2) engaged in conduct that “would

210. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (identifying how competitors are
regulated, rather than patent owners).
211. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993).
212. While “imminent” is a flexible term, the Federal Circuit uses the term to describe situations when it is essentially inevitable that the challenger will infringe the
patent. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Circuit jurisprudence interpreting imminence of infringement). For example, in the case of DuPont,
despite nearly a three-year gap between the original filing of the IPR and the operation
of the potentially infringing plant, the Court determined that infringement was “imminent.” E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1004–05 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
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give rise to a possible infringement suit.”213 This first prong is the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of what constitutes an injury in
fact.214
However, to better recognize the injury of non-infringing direct
competitors that are precluded from utilizing the invention by virtue
of innovating in the same technology space, patent challengers may
also establish an injury in fact under the alternative second prong by
showing they directly compete in the specific technology of the challenged patent.
b. Prong Two: Competing in the Same Technology Establishes a
Particularized Injury
Under the DCS Test, a patent challenger may assert an injury in
fact by demonstrating that it is a direct competitor of the specific patented technology when it is unable to establish that it is actively infringing the challenged patent. By doing so, the DCS Test recognizes
the injurious effects an invalid patent poses to competitors innovating
in the same technology space.215 Under the DCS Test, a patent challenger may establish a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to
demonstrate an injury in fact by meeting two requirements.216
In the first step of the DCS Test, a patent challenger must show
that it is a direct competitor to technology of the challenged patent—
namely, that the patent challenger competes in the same field as the
patented technology. Second, the patent challenger must establish
that it is solving similar problems with similar solutions in an already
existing design or product. These steps demonstrate that by nature of
competing in the same technology area, the patent challenger necessarily expended resources to become aware of the patent and to actively avoid it.217 The DCS Test also requires that the patent challenger
213. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). Such conduct includes that which “creates a substantial risk of future infringement or [would] likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of infringement.”
JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
214. See JTEKT Corp., 898 F.3d at 1221; see also supra note 196 and accompanying
text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s definition of injury in fact).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 192–209 (explaining how invalid patents
injure direct competitors).
216. This test is similar to the analogous prior art test of an obviousness determination, but narrower because the patent challenger must meet both prongs: that the
challenger operates in the same field of endeavor and that it solves similar problems
using similar solutions. Cf. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (applying
the analogous art test to applicant’s hairbrush product).
217. Very few, if any, producers would design without any regard for pre-existing
patents as infringing a patent could lead to treble damages and a risk of an injunction.
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is actively practicing in the same technology area, and not merely asserting patent rights. By permitting a patent challenger to establish an
injury in fact via the DCS Test, the Federal Circuit would better recognize the Supreme Court’s holding that a patent challenger need not
“bet the farm” and infringe the disputed patent to challenge its validity.218
Requirement 1: First, for a patent challenger under the DCS Test
to establish that it has suffered an injury in fact, it must show that it
has either an existing patent portfolio or existing design portfolio in a
similar technology area as the challenged patent. In other words, the
patent challenger must show that its own patent portfolio or existing
designs are in the same field of endeavor as the challenged patent.219
Like the “field of endeavor” test when assessing obviousness, the
court would first examine the patent challenger’s technology and determine whether the function and structure is generally similar to the
patented subject matter.220 To assess the field of endeavor of the challenged patent, the court may consider the “explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent [], including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.”221 To assess the patent
challenger’s field of endeavor, the court may examine both the patent
challenger’s existing designs and those under development.222 Under
the DCS Test, as with the obviousness test, the court must then use
“common sense” to assess if the field of endeavor of the patent challenger’s designs are the same as that of the patented technology.223 A
design is in the same field of endeavor if a person “of ordinary skill in
the art” would look to that technology to solve similar problems in the
field.224 An example of how this field of endeavor inquiry may work
See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. Financially, this risk would outweigh
any costs associated with investigating pre-existing patents. See Leslie, supra note 47,
at 119–20 (noting that patents, even invalid ones, force others to “investigate the patent’s scope and validity” and can deter new market entrants due to the high cost of
litigation and risk).
218. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007).
219. This is similar to the obviousness “field of endeavor” inquiry, the first branch
to determine prior art is analogous. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (applying the “field of endeavor” criteria to applicant’s gelation solution).
220. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325–26; In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.
221. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325 (first citing In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036
(C.C.P.A. 1979); then citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
222. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
223. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1326 (“[T]he Board must consider . . . and weigh
[the] circumstances from the vantage point of the common sense likely to be exerted
by one of ordinary skill in the art in assessing the scope of the endeavor.”).
224. See id.
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under the DCS Test is discussed in greater detail in the next Subsection.225 This first requirement of the DCS Test ensures that the patent
challenger is indeed innovating in the same space and therefore sustains a financial injury when being precluded from utilizing the patented technology.226
By inquiring into whether the patent challenger operates in the
same field of endeavor, the Federal Circuit can understand whether
“design incentives and other market forces” are motivating the patent
challenger to solve similar problems as the challenged patent.227 If the
patent challenger is competing in the same space, then the court can
determine that the challenger is concretely injured by the allegedly
invalid patent.228 As an example, if the challenged patent covers a gel
used in the extraction of hydrocarbons from a well, while the patent
challenger has an existing patent portfolio covering gels used in the
storage of hydrocarbons in a tank, this would not be considered the
same field of endeavor.229 Even though the two use a similar means, a
gel, storage is a different field of endeavor than extraction.230
While the “field of endeavor” test is helpful,231 it is not enough to
ensure that a patent challenger is particularly injured by the patented
invention.232 Thus, to ensure the patent challenger is not merely asserting a general grievance and is in fact injured by the challenged patent, under the DCS Test the non-infringing patent challenger must
show that its existing patent portfolio or designs solve similar problems as the challenged patent.233
225. See infra Part III.B.
226. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
227. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007); see id. (“[A] court must
ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements
according to their established functions.”).
228. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing concrete injury).
229. Cf. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (highlighting the differences
in function between the two gels).
230. See id. at 660 (holding that the gel used in extraction is non-analogous).
231. The “field of endeavor” test does not require that the problem being solved by
the two parties be the same; instead, it merely requires that the technologies be similar. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
232. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1262–
63 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a patent challenger cannot simply have a “general
grievance” that a patent places a burden on taxpayer-funded research).
233. This is similar to the doctrine of equivalents which is used to assess whether
an allegedly infringing product “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)). However, this inquiry is too narrow because if a competitor does
meet this criterion, then it would be infringing the challenged patent and therefore
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Requirement 2: To ensure a patent challenger meets the injury
in fact requirements, under the DCS Test, a patent challenger may establish a particularized injury by establishing that its current designs
solve similar problems with similar solutions.234 The designs put forth
by the patent challenger may be designs currently in production or
ones that are concretely under development. Designs may be considered concretely under development if they are sufficiently far in the
design process that they are suitable for future production.235 By utilizing such an approach, the DCS Test captures injuries faced by innovators developing technology that is close to, but not necessarily the
exact same as, the patented technology. Additionally, by requiring a
patent challenger to show either pre-existing designs or designs concretely under development, the proposed interpretation ensures that
a non-practicing entity236 cannot simply acquire the rights to a patent
within the scope of the challenged patent and then assert standing.
Since a non-practicing entity by definition does not actually produce
any product, the challenged patent it seeks to invalidate does not actually restrict its conduct.237 Limiting the establishment of an injury in
fact to only practicing entities ensures the injury is particularized and

meet the current interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s standing requirements. See supra Parts II.A–B.
234. This is similar to the second method of establishing analogous art in an obviousness assessment. Alternative to the field of endeavor test, a patent under an obviousness inquiry is considered analogous art when the reference is “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was involved,” i.e., solving
similar problems using similar solutions. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A.
1979); see also Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(analyzing the application of the “reasonably pertinent” test). But under the DCS Test,
because the patent challenger must also be operating in the same field of endeavor, the
patent challenger essentially has to meet both requirements of the analogous art inquiry for obviousness.
235. Contra JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(denying standing because “no product [was] yet finalized” which utilized the patented
design).
236. A non-practicing entity is typically a party that only holds patents and asserts
patent rights by seeking royalties from potentially infringing parties. See Kailash
Choudhary & Priyanka Rastogi, Non Practicing Entities (NPEs) and Their Impacts, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 29, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2bc351e0
-c393-4637-9c38-306ff7713557 [https://perma.cc/7BC3-5T4M]. Many of these nonpracticing entities will seek royalties from companies actually creating products and
set the royalty price low enough that the practicing company will pay off the non-practicing entity rather than undergo costly litigation. See id.
237. See id. (noting that non-practicing entities’ “primary purpose is to enforce
their patents through licenses or litigation,” and they simply “hold[] the patent[] but
do not manufacture products based on patents”).
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that the patent is actually precluding the patent challenger from utilizing the technology.238
What constitutes a similar problem and similar solution would
have to be left to the court, as it would likely be specific to the technology type and the scope of the patent.239 But it should approximately
match the scope of what the challenged patent itself covers.240 In other
words, if the challenged patent is a broad patent, then the “solving
similar problems with similar solutions” test should be correspondingly broad. A court may consider a solution similar if a person of ordinary skill in the art would look to the challenger’s design and would
have reasonably consulted the challenged patent in developing the solution.241 An example of how a court may evaluate whether a patent
challenger solves similar problems with similar solutions under the
DCS Test is discussed in further detail in the next Subsection.242 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, there is a competitive interest in ensuring a patent does not preempt use to which it is not entitled.243 The
238. Cf. Paul Gugliuzza, IP Injury and the Institutions of Patent Law, 98 IOWA L. REV.
747, 752 (2013) (discussing a proposal that the injury in fact inquiry should focus on
intellectual property law’s “fundamental purpose of promoting innovation, rather than
protecting only individual property rights”).
239. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (describing that in the
context of determining the field of endeavor, one must use “common sense likely to be
exerted by one of ordinary skill”); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997) (describing in the context of the doctrine of equivalents,
determining what constitutes an equivalence to the invention requires examining the
“context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case” (citing Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950))).
240. Cf. David Kwok, Determining Standing and Damages for Competitive Injury
from False Patent Marks, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 171, 179–81 (2012) (noting that in the context of patent marking, courts should determine which challengers have standing
based on the size of the market and scope of the patent).
241. See Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing
In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). For example, a challenged patent
disclosing an equilibrium air door and a patent challenger designing a door for asbestos removal may be considered to be solving similar problems using similar solutions,
specifically “maintaining a pressurized environment while allowing for human ingress
and egress.” See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1578–79. However, one should note that
this specific example may not pass the DCS Test because in the first step, the patent
challenger must operate in the same field of endeavor. These two designs may not be
in the same field of endeavor.
242. See infra Part III.B.
243. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“[T]he
basic tools of scientific and technological work” are excluded from patentability because “[m]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.” (first quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013); then quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2011))); Parker v.

1000

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:961

DCS Test ensures that a patent challenger directly competes within
the scope of the challenged patent—even if not practicing the invention exactly—to establish that through its competition, it suffers a concrete and particularized injury by being precluded from utilizing the
technology of the invalid patent.244
The Federal Circuit’s current interpretation fails to recognize that
a patent forces even non-infringing patent challengers, at a minimum,
to expend resources to investigate the scope of the patent and makes
them more likely to expend substantial resources to design around the
patent.245 By limiting standing to only those challengers that can show
that their pre-existing patent portfolio or designs are in the same field
of endeavor and solving similar problems using similar solutions, the
DCS Test ensures that the patent challenger is indeed suffering a real
and recognizable harm. With over 300,000 patents issued every
year,246 competitors working in the same field of endeavor and solving
similar problems with similar solutions will have to expend some
amount of money and resources to navigate the “patent thicket” or
risk being on the hook for infringement damages.247 The DCS Test captures exactly this injury. It ensures that a patent challenger appealing
an adverse IPR decision suffers a concrete and particularized injury
and is “affect[ed] . . . in a personal and individual way.”248
3. Competing in the Same Technology Area Satisfies the Actual or
Imminence Requirements of Establishing an Injury in Fact
To ensure that this proposed test adequately ensures that any patent challenger in an IPR meets the Supreme Court’s requirements of
establishing an injury in fact, the DCS Test must also satisfy the actual

Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978) (concluding that patentable subject matter should
not include ideas that preempt all use of an idea).
244. As discussed previously, this is similar to the analogous art test of the obviousness inquiry, yet it is narrower because it requires the patent challenger to meet
both prongs, thus establishing that the challenger truly is a direct competitor to the
challenged patent. See supra note 213.
245. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 154–55 (2010)
(finding increased testing and administrative costs sufficient for standing).
246. USPTO Grant Rates, PAT. BOTS, https://www.patentbots.com/stats/uspto
-grant-rates [https://perma.cc/7JQR-LWDL].
247. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 120 (noting that a company must “hack its way
through” a “patent thicket, [i.e.,] a dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights” to commercialize any sort of new technology).
248. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)).

2020]

STANDING UP TO BAD PATENTS

1001

or imminence requirements.249 It does exactly that. As long as the patent has not been invalidated, it is presumed valid and therefore actively precludes the patent challenger from practicing the invention.250 Under the DCS Test, when a competitor produces something
in the same field of endeavor as the challenged patent and solves a
similar problem using a similar solution, the competitor sustains an
ongoing injury by being precluded from utilizing the patent technology.251 This injury is actual. By upholding an allegedly invalid patent
in an IPR, the competitor is further subject to the preclusive effect of
the patent. As such, under the DCS Test, a patent challenger additionally satisfies the actual or imminence requirements necessary to establish an injury in fact.
4. Competing in the Same Technology Area Satisfies the Causal
Connection and Redressability Requirements to Satisfy Article III
Standing
To meet the requirements of Article III standing, in addition to
satisfying the injury in fact requirement, the DCS Test must also meet
the causal connection and redressability requirements.252 Again, the
DCS Test does exactly that. First, there is a causal connection between
the preclusive injury the patent challenger suffers and the patent
owner’s conduct. Even if the patent owner never asserts the patent
against a third party, the enforceability of the patent still poses a continual threat of litigation.253 This means that just the mere possession
of an invalid patent can deter others from practicing the invention.254
Thus, this injury is directly attributable to the patent owner.255 Second, a favorable decision for the patent challenger would redress the
plaintiff’s asserted injury in fact. Upon appeal, if the Federal Circuit
were to invalidate the challenged patent, it would allow the patent
249. See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text (discussing imminence as it
relates to establishing injury in fact).
250. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims . . . .”).
251. See supra Parts III.A.1–2.
252. See supra Part II.A.
253. See Leslie, supra note 47, at 113–29 (noting that the “mere presence of a patent distorts markets even if the patent-holder takes no affirmative steps to enforce
the patent” by creating fear of litigation, increased costs of market entry, delay of market entry, and more).
254. See id.
255. See id. at 115, 139 (finding that “[t]he monopolist’s possession of a patent—
even an invalid one—serves as a head on a pike,” and “the market-blocking, cost-raising effects of invalid patents exist regardless of a new competitor’s beliefs about the
patent’s validity”).
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challenger to utilize the technology without fear of a future infringement suit.256 Thus, a favorable decision by the court would remedy the
patent challenger’s injury. Accordingly, the DCS Test meets all three
requirements of establishing an injury in fact and all three requirements sufficient to establish Article III standing. This test fits within
the Supreme Court’s precedent of what is necessary to establish Article III standing257 while also carrying out Congress’s intent to make it
easier to invalidate patents which likely should not have been granted
in the first place.258
B. APPLYING THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO EXEMPLARY CASES
To better explain how the DCS Test might be applied, this Section
applies the proposed test to two examples. The first is a hypothetical
example based on a real patent. The second is from a case decided by
the Federal Circuit denying standing to the patent challenger. These
cases demonstrate the exact type of circumstances in which the Federal Circuit has failed to recognize the preclusive injury imposed by an
invalid patent that the Supreme Court has recognized impose ongoing
burdens on competitors.259 However, as detailed in the previous Section, these sorts of patent challengers meet the Article III standing requirements, and the Federal Circuit should have decided the merits of
their invalidity challenge in their IPR appeal.260
1. Example of the DCS Test Applied to a Hypothetical Challenge to a
Real Patent
To help clarify how the proposed interpretation of standing under the DCS Test might work, this Subsection discusses a fairly simple
hypothetical example. In this example, assume that the Federal Circuit
is deciding whether to grant standing to Company H appealing an adverse decision in its IPR challenging one of Company G’s modern
“smart” thermostat patents.261 Assume that H itself also produces
256. See Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(holding that a patent holder is estopped from asserting validity of a patent that has
been previously declared invalid).
257. See supra Part II.A.
258. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing MedImmune and Cardinal Chemical in which the Supreme Court acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s failure
to recognize the injurious effect of invalid patents).
260. See supra Part II.A.
261. See HVAC Controller with User-Friendly Installation Features Facilitating
Both Do-It-Yourself and Professional Installation Scenarios, U.S. Patent No. 9,541,300
[hereinafter ’300 Patent].
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smart thermostats. Because H has existing designs in the smart thermostat space, it satisfies the first step of establishing that it operates
in the same field of endeavor as G.262
Additionally, assume that G’s challenged patent covers a thermostat that incorporates a processor configured to electrically detect
which terminals of the thermostat are connected to the wiring system
of the heating and cooling system within a building.263 With G’s patent,
when a user first connects the thermostat to a given system, the thermostat electrically detects which terminals have been connected to
determine how to operate the building heating and cooling system.
Similar to G’s patent, H’s existing smart thermostat designs detect
which wires are connected to it. However, instead of electrically detecting each wire, H’s thermostat mechanically detects each wire.264
Under step two, H is solving similar problems with similar solutions as G’s patent. H’s design is aimed at detecting which wires are
connected to the thermostat, using a mechanical detection technique
instead of an electrical one.265 Thus, H satisfies both steps one and two
of the DCS Test. If H seeks to use the technology of G’s patent, but believes the patent is invalid, then H will likely file an IPR because it is
injured by being precluded from utilizing G’s patented technology.
Since H meets both steps one and two of the DCS Test, it has established that it suffered an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, even without directly infringing G’s patent.266

262. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text (discussing how a patent challenger can satisfy the field of endeavor requirements).
263. See ’300 Patent, supra note 261. The purpose of this patent is to make installing a new thermostat in a home easier. Id. col. 2 ll. 5–24. A thermostat usually has
more wiring terminals than wires connected to it because it can be used to operate
several different heating and cooling systems, such as a heat pump and air conditioner,
or a furnace, air-conditioner, and humidifier system. See id. col. 15 ll. 16–31. By sensing
which wires are connected, the thermostat can configure itself to operate the components of the heating and cooling system of that home specifically. See id. col. 15 ll. 32–
40.
264. A thermostat might do this by using a spring-loaded wiring terminal whereby
the thermostat detects the force exerted by the spring. See id. col. 16 ll. 28–34. If the
thermostat detects a high force, then a wire is connected, but if it detects a low force,
then no wire was connected.
265. Accordingly, this design solves similar problems using similar solutions based
on common sense. See supra notes 223–26 and accompanying text (discussing the use
of common sense to determine when two designs address similar problems with similar solutions).
266. See supra Part II.A.

1004

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:961

2. Example of the DCS Test Applied to a Decided Federal Circuit
Case
Another example of how the DCS Test might operate if implemented by the Federal Circuit can be demonstrated using JTEKT Corp.
v. GKN Automotive Ltd.267 In the actual decision, the Federal Circuit denied JTEKT standing because it could not establish that it was actively
utilizing the patented invention or that it was concretely going to utilize the patent—JTEKT was still “validating its design.”268 But under
the DCS Test, JTEKT would likely be able to establish that it suffered
an injury in fact sufficient to meet the Article III standing requirements.
JTEKT and GKN both manufacture drivetrain systems for the automotive industry.269 As such, both companies directly compete for
many of the same customers.270 GKN’s challenged patent (the ’440 patent) disclosed a drivetrain for a four-wheel drive vehicle that was designed to reduce the number of rotating components when switched
into two-wheel drive mode to minimize power loss.271 When JTEKT
petitioned for IPR of the ’440 patent, it was developing a similar
drivetrain for switching a vehicle from four-wheel drive mode to twowheel drive mode.272 Additionally, JTEKT had a patent (the ’492 patent) covering a similar four-wheel drive drivetrain for switching to a
two-wheel drive system.273 While GKN’s ’440 patent used side shaft
couplings, JTEKT’s ’492 patent used twin clutches.274
While JTEKT was unable to establish that it was actively using the
claims of GKN’s ’440 patent, under the proposed DCS Test, JTEKT
would likely establish an injury in fact and therefore have the Federal
Circuit decide the merits of its appeal. Under step one of the DCS Test,
JTEKT would have to establish that it operated in the same field of endeavor.275 JTEKT likely satisfies this step. JTEKT operates in the same
267. JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
268. Id. at 1221.
269. See Products, JTEKT N.A. CORP., https://jtekt-na.com/products [https://
perma.cc/GPM9-55VY]; GKN Automotive, GKN AUTO., https://www.gknautomotive
.com [https://perma.cc/PF7W-AZ6Q].
270. See JTEKT Corp., 898 F.3d at 1221.
271. See Drive Train for a Vehicle with Connectable Secondary Axle, U.S. Patent No.
8,215,440 col. 1 ll. 19–29.
272. Brief of Appellant JTEKT Corp. at 23, JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d
1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 2017-1828), 2017 WL 4182728, at *15.
273. See Four-Wheel Drive Vehicle and Method for Controlling Four-Wheel Drive
Vehicle, U.S. Patent No. 9,630,492 [hereinafter ’492 Patent].
274. See Brief of Appellant JTEKT Corp., supra note 272, at 26.
275. See supra Part III.A.2.
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field of endeavor as GKN’s challenged ’440 patent, specifically producing automotive drivetrain systems.276 Next, in step two of the DCS
Test, JTEKT must also establish that it has existing designs which solve
similar problems with similar solutions.277
Under step two, JTEKT has at least one patent, the ’492 patent,
which solves a similar problem with a similar solution as GKN’s ’440
patent.278 Specifically, the ’492 patent uses twin clutches to efficiently
shift between a two-wheel drive state and a four-wheel drive state.279
However, under the DCS Test, since this is merely a patent, JTEKT
must additionally establish that it has a pre-existing design or one concretely under development which incorporates the technology of the
’492 patent. JTEKT likely satisfies this requirement based on testimony by one of its patent engineers, though the exact design plans
were under seal to protect JTEKT’s intellectual property interests.280
Specifically, JTEKT’s designs sought to efficiently shift the automotive
drivetrain between a two-wheel drive state and a four-wheel drive
state without the use of a differential.281 However, instead of using
side-shaft couplings like GKN’s challenged ’440 patent, JTEKT sought
to use twin clutches.282 Thus, JTEKT was likely solving similar problems using similar solutions with its pre-existing designs or at the
least concretely developing designs. As a result, JTEKT likely meets
both steps one and two of the DCS Test and sufficiently demonstrates
an injury in fact to establish Article III standing before the Federal Circuit.
C. THE DCS TEST MITIGATES NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE PATENT QUALITY
PROBLEM, BOOSTING INNOVATION FOR THE FUTURE
In addition to meeting the Article III constitutional requirements
and better aligning with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of standing in patent cases, the proposed DCS Test also fits in with Congress’s
276. See Lindsay Chappell, Despite Steady Numbers, Sector Churns, AUTO. NEWS,
June 2018, at 4, 4–5 (detailing that GKN produces “driveline halfshafts, driveshafts &
AWD” and JTEKT produces “driveline systems”).
277. See supra notes 230–36 and accompanying text.
278. See ’492 Patent, supra note 276.
279. See id. col. 2 ll. 63–67.
280. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“‘[T]he general features of JTEKT’s current concepts [are] similar enough to the features of the ’440 patent,’ to justify filing the IPR to ‘negat[e] any potential risk for
JTEKT’ . . . .” (second and third alterations in original)).
281. See ’492 Patent, supra note 273, at col. 2 ll. 63–67.
282. See Drive Train for a Vehicle with Connectable Secondary Axle, U.S. Patent No.
8,215,440; ’492 Patent, supra note 273, at col. 2 ll. 63–67.
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goal of mitigating the negative effects of invalid patents.283 The DCS
Test overcomes the deficiencies of the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation of what constitutes an injury in fact for patent challengers
by recognizing the preclusive and injurious effect invalid patents pose
to direct competitors.284
The Federal Circuit’s current interpretation prohibits direct competitors from asserting an injury in fact unless they show they are currently engaging in an infringing activity or establish that there is a risk
of infringement in a future design that is not subject to change during
the design process.285 However, if the design is even somewhat subject to change, as currently interpreted, the Federal Circuit will deny
standing.286
The Federal Circuit’s current interpretation ignores that non-infringing companies working in the same technology space and solving
similar problems will inevitably face expenditures to design around
an invalid patent to ensure they do not face potential treble damages
and an injunction.287 Thus, the DCS Test addresses this concern and
allows a non-infringing direct competitor to assert standing when it
faces direct effects of the regulation of the potentially invalid patent.
The DCS Test, while expansive, ensures that the patent challenger’s injury is sufficiently particularized and concrete such that it
is not simply asserting a general grievance. As Congress has recognized, competitors often have “the most relevant prior art available
and incentive to seek to invalidate an allegedly defective patent.”288 By
allowing competitors to challenge the validity of patents on appeal of
an IPR, the Federal Circuit would help mitigate the Patent Office’s
quality problem that even the Patent Office itself has recognized.289
Allowing more IPR appeals to reach the courts would help not only
direct competitors but also the public at large by encouraging innovation and helping to push technology forward at an even faster pace.
283. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s intent to
make it easier to invalidate illegitimate patents).
284. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 928 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (denying standing even though the patent challenger competed in the same turbofan business as the patent holder and sought to utilize a variation of its previous geared-fan
engine design precluded by the challenged patent).
285. See JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
286. See id. (denying standing because “no product [was] yet finalized” that utilized the patented design).
287. See supra Part III.A.1.
288. H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 4 (2001).
289. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (acknowledging the Patent Office’s quality problem).
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CONCLUSION
The Patent Office inevitably issues invalid patents due to its limited amount of time to review applications.290 In establishing inter
partes review, Congress sought to help alleviate the negative effects of
any potential invalid patents.291 Congress recognized the injurious effect that these patents impose on direct competitors, removing
knowledge that should otherwise be in the public domain, and sought
to create a more efficient system to challenge these patents.292 However, the Federal Circuit thwarts that mission by denying direct competitors standing when appealing adverse IPR decisions. What the
Federal Circuit fails to recognize is that even non-infringing direct
competitors suffer a concrete and particularized injury from the preclusive effect of a patent.
Under the proposed DCS Test, a patent challenger appealing an
adverse IPR decision may establish an injury in fact if it both (1) operates in the same field of endeavor as the subject matter of the challenged patent, and (2) has pre-existing designs which solve similar
problems with similar solutions. These two requirements recognize
that a patent challenger faces a concrete and particularized injury by
expending resources to avoid the patent and is the one subject to the
preclusive effect of a patent despite not actively infringing the patent.
Such injuries should be sufficient to establish an injury in fact and confer Article III standing on patent challengers directly competing in the
technology of the challenged patent.293 By utilizing the DCS Test, the
Federal Circuit will properly adhere to Congress’s desire to better allow competitors to challenge invalid patents,294 opening up technology that should otherwise remain available for public use. Only then
will the patent system truly ensure that only those who innovate and
push forward science and the useful arts may obtain and keep their
patents.

290. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (noting the Patent Office’s difficulties in always issuing quality, valid patents).
291. See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text (identifying Congress’s purpose
in establishing IPR).
292. See supra Part I.C (discussing in greater depth Congress’s motivations in establishing IPR).
293. See supra Part II.A (noting current Article III standing requirements and their
application by the Federal Circuit in IPR appeals).
294. See supra Part I.C.

